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Abstract: Metaphors are considered as instruments crucial for persuasion. How-
ever, while many studies and works have focused on their emotive, communica-
tive, and persuasive effects, the argumentative dimension that represents the core
of their “persuasiveness” is almost neglected. This paper addresses the problem of
explaining howmetaphors can communicate arguments, and how it is possible to
reconstruct and justify them. To this purpose, a distinction is drawn between the
arguments that are communicated metaphorically and interpreted based on
relevance considerations, and the ones that are triggered implicitly by the use of a
metaphorical expression. In both cases, metaphorical arguments are recon-
structed through different patterns of argument, called argumentation schemes
(Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008). However, while the purpose of a metaphorical
sequence of discourse (called metaphorical move) can guide and justify the
reconstruction of the argument that can sufficiently support the intended
conclusion in a persuasive move, a more complex analysis is needed for analyzing
the additional inferences that a metaphorical move can trigger. These inferences
are claimed to represent part of the connotation of the metaphorical expression
and can be captured through its most frequent collocations, determinable using
some tools of the corpus linguistics.
Keywords: argumentation, dialogue moves, discourse analysis, interpretation,
metaphors, persuasion
1 Introduction
Metaphors characterize every persuasive context (Sopory and Dillard 2002: 383),
and their rhetorical (persuasive) effect can be considered as their most important
manifestation in communication (Steen 2008: 228). Metaphors are commonly
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considered as representing “an emotive function of language” (Ricoeur 1976: 49),
and instruments for evoking emotions and interpersonal intimacy (Bowes andKatz
2015; Casarett et al. 2010; Gibbs 2006;Hopper et al. 1981). Their persuasive function
has been analyzed from different cognitive and psychological perspectives (for a
review, see Burgers et al. 2016; Sopory and Dillard 2002). Metaphors have been
found to help the retrieval of information, increase the comprehension and
perception of a text (Read et al. 1990), convey emotional information creating
emotional stimuli (Barchard et al. 2013: 333), and result in both cognitive and
epistemic effects (Oswald and Rihs 2014).
All these accounts have in common the analysis of persuasion as an effect,
consisting in the modification of someone’s attitude, mental state, or behavior
(O’Keefe 2004) generated by the use of a conceptual structure or a linguistic form –
the two dominant approaches to metaphor study. The cognitive and psychological
views, however, do not exhaust the field of persuasion. Indeed, the classical study
of persuasion started with the investigation of its essential communicative in-
strument, the enthymeme (the rhetorical argument) (Aristotle, 1991a, Rhetoric
1354a 14–16). However, while arguments are the essence of persuasion, and theuse
of metaphors results in important persuasive effects (Charteris-Black 2005: 15–20),
the relationship between arguments and metaphors has been almost neglected.
Only few studies have addressed the argumentative nature of metaphors, mostly
focusing on their function as parts of arguments (Santibáñez 2010), the analogical
argumentative reasoning triggered by them (Macagno and Zavatta 2014), and their
use in communicative persuasive contexts (Ervas et al. 2016; Ervas et al. 2018;
Oswald and Rihs 2014). However, also in these studies metaphorical arguments
have been considered as mere analogies – a strategy for expressing different types
of argumentsmore than an argument in itself (Macagno 2017; Macagno et al. 2017).
The relation betweenmetaphor and arguments becomes extremely problematic
and important when we consider metaphors as part of language use, namely when
their communicative function becomes the object of study (Steen 2008: 221). At a
communicative and pragmatic level, metaphors have a persuasive function or goal
because through their use arguments (or components thereof) are conveyed. How-
ever, how can a metaphorical utterance communicate one or more specific argu-
ments and, more importantly, what arguments dometaphorical utterances convey?
The answer leads to a methodological issue, namely justifying the reconstruction of
the arguments that represent the interpretation of metaphorical utterances.
This paper advances an attempt to address the reconstruction of the function
of metaphors as triggers of argumentative inferences, presenting an analytical
(methodological) proposal. The analytical process for reconstructingmetaphorical
inferences will be articulated in three steps: 1) the determination of the dialogical
function of a metaphorical utterance, 2) the reconstruction of the argument
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necessary for pursuing the presumable goal of the utterance, and 3) the recon-
struction of the additional (side) arguments evoked by the so-called “connotation”
of the vehicle.
2 Metaphors and their communicative effects
According to the Aristotelian account, metaphors are defined as a type of “trans-
ference” (Aristotle, 1991b, Poetics 1457b, 7–10), where the name of a concept (the
vehicle) is used for referring to a different concept (the tenor or target) (Black 1955:
280–288). Metaphors are thus regarded as instruments that bring about a con-
ceptual reorganization, extending the boundaries of a concept (Leech 1981: 37).
The transference results in different types of effects, including the cognitive and
the rhetorical ones. As Aristotle underscored in his Rhetoric when considering the
crucial link between pleasure and learning (Moran 2017: 51), metaphors are in-
struments for making a concept at the same time easier to understand and inter-
esting, due to their “strangeness” caused by their use outside their ordinary
contexts (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1410b, 10–16). According to this view, strangeness
generates marvel, and thus pleasure, which attracts attention and desire to un-
derstand new ideas. However, the rhetorical effect of pleasure in understanding
can be achieved only when strangeness meets familiarity: metaphors need to be at
the same time known by the interlocutor, but foreign and appropriate to the target.
This balance, called kairos (aptness or opportunity to the specific context) (Kin-
neavy 2002: 67), involves the triggering of emotions (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1408a, 10).
In the literature in the fields of rhetoric and communication, metaphors have
been associated with the communicative function of persuading. According to
Ricoeur, metaphors are persuasive as they represent a purely emotive function of
language, not providing any new information about reality (Ricoeur 1976: 49). The
persuasive effects have been also accounted for as resulting from the “trans-
ference” that defines as metaphor, namely the “riddle” that is implied by it
(Aristotle, Rhetoric 1415b, 9), which results in persuasive effects (Ottati and
Renstrom 2010; Sopory and Dillard 2002: 385–387).
In pragmatics, the analysis of the communicative effects of metaphors has
distinguished the interpretative dimension from the further pragmatic inferences
that can be drawn from the use of a metaphorical utterance. Metaphorical utter-
ances (defined as utterances that are either intended to be understood meta-
phorically or to which it is possible to attribute a metaphorical interpretation,
Kittay 1989: 148), are considered as instances of the normal process of utterance
interpretation, and more precisely an end of the “literal-loose-metaphorical”
continuum (Carston and Wearing 2011; Gibbs 1992; Sperber and Wilson 2008;
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Wilson and Carston 2006). This interpretative process concerns a specific
circumstance in which the “literal meaning of a predicate is not what the speaker
intends to communicate,” and this discrepancy can be overcome either by loos-
ening of predicate, or developing specific concepts from properties that are not
drawn from the encyclopedic entry of the vehicle. The inferential process used for
retrieving the properties that necessary for constructing the “ad hoc” concept
(normally referred to as “metaphorical genus,” or nameless category, Hesse 1965:
329; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Macagno 2017) are distinguished from the
contextual effects ofmetaphor use (Carston 2002: 85–86; Sperber andWilson 1995:
236). According to this perspective, metaphors trigger both implicatures that are
strongly implicated (namely encouraged by the manifestness of the speaker’s
intention) and a broader or narrower range of weak ones, depending on whether
they are more creative or conventional (Pilkington 2000: chap. 4). Weak impli-
catures are inferences that can be drawn from the use of the metaphor, but that are
not determinate (the hearer can choose among a range of them), and are not the
result of a strong encouragement by the speaker (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 199;
Sperber and Wilson 2008).
The relationship between metaphor interpretation, pragmatic inferences, and
persuasion is highlighted by the framing function of metaphors. Metaphors are
instruments for constructing meaning, and this function is crucial for the under-
standing of new phenomena (Jaszczolt 2002: 358; Ortony 1975: 45). The trans-
ference of understanding implies the selection of the aspects of a phenomenon that
are conveyed both directly and indirectly through a metaphor (Schiappa 2003:
chap. 9; Semino, Demjén and Demmen 2016). For example, to explain why self-
management is important in the context of diabetes care, the high levels of gly-
cemia affecting people with diabetes can be described as pollutants into the blood
that need to be kept under control (Rossi et al. submitted). By framing the con-
ceptual domain of diabetes in terms of the more familiar conceptual domain of
pollution, some characteristics related to what the interlocutor already knows
about pollution are used to explain the aspect of glycemia that matters most to the
patient, namely the dangers and risks resulting from it (Ervas et al. 2018). However,
this framing, by highlighting some properties of the target, can hide others that can
be relevant, and result in “emergent meanings not directly limited to speakers’ or
writers’ communicative intentions” (Gibbs 1992: 587). For example, a patient can
understand that glycemia is a substance that is only dangerous to the body, and
that is external to it.
The aforementioned accounts underscore a relationship between the commu-
nicative effects of metaphorical utterances and the inferences that they trigger or
that can be drawn from them.However, the relationship betweenmetaphor use and
inferences, and between metaphors, persuasion and understanding is accounted
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formostly in cognitive terms (Oswald and Rihs 2014). If wemove from the cognitive
level to the analysis of discourse (corresponding to the logical and communicative
level), howcanweexplain how inferences are drawn frommetaphorical utterances,
and in particular the inferences intended to “persuade” the interlocutor or resulting
in this effect?
The passage from the cognitive to the communicative level in the analysis of
the persuasive effects of metaphor use hinges on the notion of argument, the
essential instrument of persuasion. Arguments are not only logical structures; they
are primarily pragmatic elements. An argument is instruments for addressing not
only a doubt or a difference of opinions, but also a proposal, an offer, a doubtful
piece of information, or a hypothesis (Walton 1990a). Similarly, an explanation is
an act aimed at transferring understanding (Walton 2004), but this understanding
can concern the content of different types of communicative acts, such as the
sharing of information, a proposal, a premise in an argument, a hypothesis, etc. In
this sense, the categories of persuasion and explanation (understanding) need to
be framed within the bigger picture of the conversational goals of metaphors in
order to explain what the latter are used for (Macagno and Rossi, forthcoming). On
this perspective, the explanatory and persuasive effects of metaphors need to be
analyzed in a dialogical perspective taking into account the conversational goals
that they are intended to serve, namely their communicative relevance (Clark 1987;
Goatly 2011; Macagno 2018).
3 The conversational functions of metaphors
Asmentioned above, Aristotle highlighted howmetaphors involve “riddles.” Froma
pragmatic perspective, metaphors have been considered as the solution of an
enigma, inwhich “a newpertinence, a new congruence, is established in such away
that the utterance ‘makes sense’ as a whole” (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 146). As explained
above, the reconstruction of this looser or “ad hoc” meaning has been analyzed
considering the “evidence that the communicator intends to convey” a meaning
that is not encoded (Sperber and Wilson, 2008), building on assumptions that the
speaker makes strongly or weakly manifest. However, this approach is rooted in a
cognitive view to relevance, which leads to the problem of determining an objective
and assessableway how ametaphor can be relevant, andmore importantly to what.
At a communicative level, the literature onmetaphors has underscored the essential
importance of determining the “joint action” (Kovecses 2015: 178–180; Goatly 2011:
292) and the “local context” (Kovecses 2015: 188) to which a metaphorical utterance
contributes. To determine what a metaphorical utterance means, it becomes crucial
to understand first the conversational goal that it is used to pursue.
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3.1 Metaphorical moves
In the literature, the different possible conversational goals of metaphors have
beenwidely acknowledged. Metaphors can be used differently for pursuing a wide
range of goals including explaining, summarizing, supporting a viewpoint, illus-
trating, clarifying or persuading (Cameron 2003; Goatly 2011: 148–167; Semino
2008a). However, the analysis of such goals has never been addressed systemat-
ically, nor is the unit of analysis clearly established. The problems that can arise
can be explained considering the following metaphorical utterance1:
Example 1
Physician: “If I know that my blood pressure is, let’s say, dancing, I measure it.”
This excerptwas taken froma healthcare provider-patient interview in the context of
diabetes care. The doctor is providing instructions to the patient, and she is using a
metaphorical utterance to achieve her goal. However, what is the conversational
goal of this excerpt? To capture how she intends to contribute to the conversational
setting, we need to recognize that her utterance has a twofold function. On the one
hand, it advances an implicit proposal of action (“you should measure your blood
pressure”); on the other hand, it provides an explicit argument in support thereof
(“you have a dancing blood pressure; if [someone] knows that [his or her] blood
pressure is dancing, [s/he] should to measure it”). The utterance modifies the
conversational setting in twodistinct and interrelatedways: first, it suggests a course
of action (which the patient can accept or reject); however, it also provides a reason
therefor (which the patient can rebut through a counterargument).
From a dialogical point of view, metaphorical utterances can be regarded as
specific instances of dialogue moves, namely sequences (Grosz and Sidner 1986:
177) (corresponding to utterances or aggregates or parts thereof) aimed at pro-
posing a dialogue to the interlocutor (Macagno and Bigi 2017b). A move is the
representation of a dialogical intention (corresponding to the general speaker’s
higher-order intentions), namely the interactional (or, more precisely, communi-
cative) goal (or purpose) that a speaker pursues with his or her linguistic act
(Bellack et al. 1966; Merin 1994: 238; Sinclair and Coulthard 1992; Stubbs 1983;
Walton 2007; Widdowson 1979: 144). As the literature on moves pointed out since
its beginning (Bellack et al. 1966; Labov and Fanshel 1977), moves can be defined
more specifically or generally based on the type of interaction to be analyzed.
However, while the literature on the analysis of practice-related disciplines has
engaged in detailed classifications of moves, the general categories of dialogue
1 Example discussed in (Rossi et al. submitted).
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moves has been unexplored. In (Macagno and Bigi 2017b; Macagno and Bigi 2020),
the taxonomy of dialogue types developed in argumentation and formal models of
dialogue (Walton 1989; Walton 1990a) were used to provide a classification of the
most generic moves, which are represented as follows (Figure 1).
On this perspective, metaphors are the result of the interpretation, not simply
of an utterance (Ricoeur 1976: 49–50), but of a sequence of discourse that is
produced to pursue a specific conversational goal, which can be reconstructed
based on different types of clues, including the co-text, the conversational setting,
and the context (Levinson 1992; Levinson 2012; Sanders 1987; Sanders 2013).
Metaphors can be interpreted considering the goal they are used for.
3.2 Types of metaphorical moves
The aforementioned types of metaphorical moves can be illustrated through some
illustrative examples, showing the strict interrelation between the conversational
setting, the move, and the metaphorical meaning (Rossi et al. submitted). Some
cases drawn from a specific corpus of diabetes care interviews will be discussed
(Bigi 2014; Macagno and Bigi 2020), in order to reconstruct more easily the
context needed for determining the speaker’s conversational goal.
The first and most important rhetorical function of metaphors, persuasion,
is defined in our aforementioned scheme as the support of the acceptability of a
Figure 1: Classification of dialogical intentions.
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potentially doubtful viewpoint (Walton 1990a). In Example 2, the dietician is
justifying the advice (proposal) of keeping healthy habits also on vacation, as the
diabetes canworsen. However, instead of showing how small variations in diet can
affect health conditions, she uses a series of metaphors to represent the unrea-
sonable patient’s reasoning2.
Example 2
Dietician: “When you go on vacation, you carry the diabetes with you, you don’t lock it up in
Milan when you leave. The diabetes stays with you.”
Here, metaphors convey the grounded denial of the patient’s medical explanation
of the functioning of diabetes. This apparent explanation presents a viewpoint
(the patient’s) with which the interlocutor cannot agree anymore, unless he ac-
cepts to be committed to a nonsense. Unlike Example 1, Example 2 expresses one
communicative goal – attacking the (possible) view of the addressee – devoting a
different turn (and utterance) to advancing the proposal of action.
As shown in Example 1, metaphorical moves can be used for making a pro-
posal, namely suggesting a course of action. A clear example is the following, in
which the nurse is indicating a specific course of action (monitoring in a specific
way the glycemic values) to the patient3:
Example 3
Nurse: “For a person who works, I understand that it is more complex. However, we need to do
it like I say, a bitmore reasoned, as I can start off with a good value, but what happens after
I have eaten?”
In this example, the secondmove (“weneed to do it like I say, a bitmore reasoned”)
is aimed at making a proposal, and it is followed by a justification (persuasion
move).
The classical explanatory function of metaphors serves a specific communi-
cative function in our corpus, namely sharing information and causal relations
that can be used for further purposes. The most prototypical use of “explanatory”
metaphors are metaphorical moves aimed at sharing knowledge concerning a
medical concept. The following example (discussed in Rossi 2016, 42; Ervas et al.
2016, 106) shows the use of multiple metaphors for clarifying a technical concept
that could be hardly understood by the patient. The physician uses the “river” and
2 Example discussed in (MacagnoandRossi, forthcoming). The original text of this and the further
examples, in Italian, has been translated by the author.
3 Example discussed in (Rossi et al. submitted; Macagno and Rossi 2019).
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“pollutants” metaphors to inform the interlocutor of the causal relationship be-
tween glucose and the human body, describing then two of the most important
concepts to understand diabetes functioning and management (glycemia and
glycated hemoglobin) through the metaphors of the “size” and the “model.”
Example 4
Physician: “The blood is like a river with polluting substances, which we need to keep under
control. The glycaemia during the day tells me how I am doing at that specific moment. The
glycated hemoglobin tells me the global trend of diabetes. If I go to buy a dress, the glycated
hemoglobin is the size, and glycaemia is the model. The size tells me my condition; I can then
customize the model.”
In this case, the doctor’s goal is to provide a description of the functioning of the
diabetes and its indicators that can be accessible to the interlocutor.
The information-sharing goal can concern also other types of information. A
frequent case is the use of metaphors for referring to symptoms that the patient
needs to recognize, such as the following4:
Example 5
Nurse: “Put your feet up, so that we can examine them. Have you got some annoying sensations
such as tingling, burnings, spasms?”
Nurse: “Sensations that some pins are stinging you?”
The metaphors are used here to request information, explaining it in a way that it
is easier for the patient to access it.
Finally, explanatory metaphors are used in information-sharing moves for
providing a general idea of the subject matter, which in the medical context consid-
ered is aimed at providing basic understanding to interlocutors with little knowledge
of medical procedures or concepts. An illustrative example is the following5:
Example 6
Nurse: “<this way of testing the values> gives us also a more complete picture, so that we
know also how to intervene with the therapy.”
The “more complete picture” refers to the combined trends ofmeasurements taken
at specific intervals. This metaphorical move shares the information necessary for
the patient’s assessment of the proposal made.
4 Example discussed in (Rossi et al. submitted).
5 Example discussed in (Rossi et al. submitted).
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Metaphors are used also in other less frequent types of moves, namely
negotiating and rapport building. In the first case, metaphors can be used, for
example, for emphasizing the importance of an option or the insignificance of a
specific effort, practice, etc. A frequent case is the use of “a little moment” (un
attimino) (a temporal indication) to express a modal adverb (quickly, rapidly)
and thus lead the interlocutor to performing an action that can be refused based
on time consumption reasons. Rapport-building metaphorical moves are used to
express intimacy or distance, or pointing out the characteristics of the relation-
ship (“right now I have an agreement with you,” see Macagno and Bigi 2017a)
These examples illustrate the most frequent and most prototypical uses of
metaphorical moves in a specific corpus. However, this analysis appears to be
incomplete. Metaphorical moves are used to pursue a communicative goal, which
in several cases could have been achieved probably more clearly through non-
metaphorical moves. Then, why are metaphorical moves used instead? The most
evident characteristic of thesemoves is that their communicative purpose does not
exhaust their communicative function. The hypothesis of this paper is that it is
possible to explain a fundamental dimension of the additional communicative
function of metaphorical moves in terms of arguments. To this purpose, it is useful
to analyze first their use for supporting a viewpoint, reconstructing the intended
and the side arguments that they trigger.
4 The argumentative uses of metaphors
The relationship between a metaphorical move and its “persuasive” effects can be
described by developing the Relevance Theory distinction between strong and
weak implicatures. The inferences necessary for supporting the intended conclu-
sion of a metaphorical move (Kittay 1989: 158) need to be distinguished from the
further inferences that can be drawn from the use of a metaphor. In this section we
will focus on the first type of arguments communicated metaphorically, namely
the ones reconstructed by taking into account only their “focus-interpretation”
(Reinhart 1976: 391–392), or rather the properties that are relevant to the context
(the intended conclusion to be defended) (Macagno 2018).
4.1 Metaphorical arguments: “Locking the diabetes up”
The process of reconstruction of the argumentative function of metaphors can be
illustrated through the examples discussed above. In Example 2, the dietician is
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providing a reason for the recommendation to continue monitoring the diabetes
and complying with dietary instructions:
Dietician: “When you go on vacation, you carry the diabetes with you, you don’t lock it up in
Milan when you leave. The diabetes stays with you.”
This argument instantiates the combination of an argument from cause effect and
an argument from consequences, where the latter represents the relation between
an event considered as positive or negative and the action that is likely to bring it
about or prevent it. In this case, the dietician is attacking the following two-step
reasoning that she attributes to the patient. The first inferential step can be
reconstructed as a complex argument from cause to effect (Walton et al. 2008: 168):
This alleged inference justifies the patient’s intention not to comply with di-
etary instructions and other recommendation for controlling the diabetes. This last
inferential step can be reconstructed as follows (Walton et al. 2008: 332):
The physician could have simply denied the first causal arguments without any
need of a metaphorical move. The metaphorical expressions add an additional
argument, which falls into the scheme of an argument from commitment. The met-
aphors provide a correspondence between deciding not to monitor the symptoms of
diabetes (and complyingwith thediet) on vacation anddecidingnot to bring anobject
(trouble, etc.) in the suitcase. This analogy leads to an evaluation of the speaker’s
commitment, triggering a reasoning from commitment (Walton et al. 2008: 132):
Argumentation scheme : Argument from consequences.
PREMISE  If the patient fails to take care of diabetes, then the effects of
diabetes on his health conditions will worsen.
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCE
PREMISE
The worsening of health conditions is a bad outcome (from
the point of view of the patient’s goals), and bad outcomes
should be prevented by not bringing about their causes.
EXCEPTION OF THE CONSEQUENT
OF PREMISE 
The negative effects of diabetes on his health will not occur
when he is on vacation.
PREMISE  The patient is going on vacation.
CONCLUSION Therefore, the patient does not need to take care of diabetes
(as his health condition may not worsen anyhow).
Argumentation scheme : Argument from cause to effect.
PREMISE  Generally, if a person goes on vacation, the diabetes will not affect him or her.
PREMISE  Generally, if the diabetes is not affecting a person on vacation occurs, then its
negative effects on health will not occur.
PREMISE  The patient is going on vacation.
CONCLUSION Therefore, the negative effects of diabetes on his health will not occur.
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The linkage of commitments is achieved through the extended metaphor,
which is, however, denied as absurd. The absurdity of the commitments attributed
to the patient results in ridiculing his viewpoint, and thus his behavior. This
rhetorical and argumentative effect leads the patient to denying his original
alleged commitment.
4.2 Metaphorical arguments: “Dancing”
The reconstruction of the argumentative structure underlying the relationship
between a metaphor and its purpose can be applied to other cases of persuasive
moves. In the first excerpt above (Example 1), we described the persuasivemove of
a physician who is trying to lead the patient to monitoring his blood pressure:
Physician: “If I know that my blood pressure is, let’s say, dancing, I measure it.”
Here, the physician is providing a reason for an action, i. e., measuring the blood
pressure, expressing the inferential principle connecting a condition to a recom-
mendation. This inference is commonly described as a type of practical argument
(Macagno and Walton 2018; Walton 1990b), which can be reconstructed consid-
ering only theminimum role of themetaphor, namely indicating a condition of the
organism that justifies the need of action.
The metaphor, describing a fluctuating (variable) trend of the patient’s blood
pressure, is advanced as a support of the recommendation. Themetaphoricalmove
thus presents a reason for action based on specific properties of a state of affairs,
which – considering the definition(s) of the vehicle and the properties resulting
from its dictionary meaning – are purely descriptive. For this reason, the only
scheme that can represent the relationship between a state of affairs not assessed
as positive or negative nor defined in terms of the interlocutor’s interests and a
practical recommendation is a rule-based argument (Macagno and Walton 2018).
Argumentation scheme : Argument from commitment.
COMMITMENT EVIDENCE
PREMISE
In this case, it was shown that the patient is committed to not
monitoring the diabetes on vacation (A), according to the evi-
dence of what he said or did.
LINKAGE OF COMMITMENTS
PREMISE
If the patient is committed to A, it can be inferred by analogy that
he is also committed to the fact that diabetes is an external
entity, which can be locked up, abandoned, etc.
CONCLUSION In this case, the patient is committed to the fact that diabetes is an
external entity, which can be locked up, abandoned, etc.
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Therefore, based on this interpretation, the argument follows from an inference
from rules (Walton et al. 2008: 343):
According to this interpretation, the physician is providing her suggestion
considering a rule of clinical practice, which recommends a certain behavior
(measuring) when certain conditions (variable blood pressure) occur. Unlike the
reconstruction of Example 2, this analysis, however, does not capture the
communicative reason of using a metaphor instead of a similar and less ambig-
uous lexeme such as “variable” or “fluctuating.”
4.3 Metaphorical arguments: “Journey together”
Excerpt 1 represents a limited portion of a long and complex interaction. The doctor
continues the dialog by underscoring the importance of the commitment to
develop a joint work, pointing out that the “journey together” is indeed a kind of
agreement, a joint work.
The communicative goal of Example 1 is thus to provide reasons to the patient
for complying with the physician’s instructions (making all the necessary mea-
surements and providing the necessary data). The argument that the “journey
together”metaphor in this context expresses is thus a relation between an action to
be performed by the patient (providing all the data) and a kind of agreement in
which both agents are characterized by specific roles and duties. This inferential
relation can be reconstructed as an argument from commitment, consisting in
reminding the interlocutor of his past commitments (in this case, the acceptance of
pursuing a common goal; the common engagement) from which a distinct
commitment is normally inferred (complying with the physician’s instructions;
providing the necessary data). This reasoning can be reconstructed as follows
(Argumentation scheme 3, argument from commitment):
Argumentation scheme : Argument from rules.
PREMISE  If carrying out types of actions including measuring the blood pressure more
frequently is the established rule for situations in which the blood pressure is
variable, then (unless the case is an exception), a patient with a variable blood
pressure must measure the blood pressure more frequently.
PREMISE  Carrying out types of actions including carrying out types of actions including
measuring the blood pressure more frequently is the established rule for sit-
uations in which the blood pressure is variable.
PREMISE  The patient has a variable blood pressure.
CONCLUSION Therefore, the patient must measure the blood pressure more frequently.
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This type of argument reconstruction can account for the use of the metaphor
“journey together,” as it results in commitments that need to be complied with.
However, also in this case we notice that this reconstruction mirrors only one
dimension of the argument, namely the obligations. In this case, the physician
could have opted for non-metaphorical expressions for persuading the patient
(“We are pursuing a common goal” […] “I am discussing with you, to help you”).
The reconstruction of a minimal relevance relation (Macagno 2018) between
the vehicle and the purpose of the utterance (Gibbs et al. 2011) can explain the
“strong implicatures” that metaphorical utterances license, but cannot explain
fully the argumentative effects of some metaphors. The arguments that result
from this level of understanding do not exhaust the argumentative effect of the
metaphorical move: if the latter were only a strategy for expressing an argument
that can be conveyed through non-metaphorical means, there wouldn’t be much
reason to use metaphor in the first place (Reinhart 1976: 392). In some cases,
“focus interpretation” results in a reconstruction of the argument that the
speaker intended to convey that is perceived as partial, or almost distorted. The
metaphor is regarded to add an argumentative dimension that is “weakly”
communicated, which needs to be retrieved by considering a fundamental aspect
of metaphorical meaning, namely the “system of associated commonplaces”
(Black 1955: 287).
5 Metaphors and connotation
Aristotle (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1406b, 6) pointed out how the rhetorical effectiveness
of ametaphor corresponds to its capacity to convey an emotion or judgment, which
in turn depends on its appropriateness to the context and the audience’s back-
ground (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1408a, 10–15). The effective use of a metaphorical
expression is thus constrained by the inferences that the interlocutors can draw
COMMITMENT EVIDENCE
PREMISE
In this case, it was shown that the patient is committed to a
journey together with the physician to treat patient’s diabetes,
according to the evidence of what he said or did.
LINKAGE OF COMMITMENTS
PREMISE
Generally, when an arguer is committed to a journey together to
treat the diabetes, it can be inferred that he is also committed to
complying with the physician’s instructions (and thus,
providing all the necessary data).
CONCLUSION In this case, the patient is committed to complying with the
physician’s instructions (and thus, providing all the necessary
data).
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from it – it would be inappropriate to metaphorically transfer a word commonly
used to indicate a despised state of affairs to refer to a praiseworthy event. The
vehicle carries with it a previous context of use, a “connotation” that can explain
the inferences that can be weakly drawn from its metaphorical use.
5.1 Metaphors, culture, and inferences
Black described the process of metaphor interpretation as based on the system of
commonplaces that are commonly associated with the referent of the vehicle,
which can vary across cultures (Black 1955: 287). The important aspect ofmetaphor
effectiveness, observed the philosopher, “is not that the commonplaces shall be
true, but that they should be readily and freely evoked.” This theory can be
regarded from twodistinct perspectives. On the onehand, it is a theory ofmetaphor
processing, aimed at explaining howmetaphorical meaning is interpreted. On the
other hand, it can be considered as a method for justifying a metaphorical inter-
pretation, namely the result of metaphorical processing. On this perspective, the
interpretation of the speaker’s metaphorical meaning depends also (in addition to
the intended purpose of the move that can be retrieved from the textual clues) on
the common inferences that can be drawn from the use of the vehicle in a given
culture (Deignan 2003; Gibbs and Cameron 2008: 67; Kövecses 2003), which can be
more or less relevant or accessible in a specific context (Dobrzyńska 1995: 596).
Metaphor understanding has been shown to be essentially related to culture,
or more precisely to sets of “conceptual mappings” that in many cases pre-exist
communication, structuring “our thinking, reasoning, and understanding” (Gibbs
1992: 596). The consequence of this relation is that metaphors can be interpreted
correctly only if the interlocutors share the needed common ground, which can be
broader or narrower. As Gibbs put it (Gibbs 1987: 574):
As with ambiguous language, the search for the acceptable interpretations of
most metaphors will involve a large range of cultural conventions andmutually
held beliefs, some of which may be quite idiosyncratic to particular people and
contexts. […] Thus, if two people use the word teapotted to mean something
unique such as ‘rubbing the back of someone’s leg with a teapot’, then the
expression “John teapotted the policeman” can only by interpreted correctly by
people who share this intimate knowledge.
The cultural dimension of metaphors and metaphor interpretation can become a
problem when different cultures meet, as “the ‘images’ different languages and
cultures employ can be extremely diverse” (Kövecses 2005; Kövecses 2010;
Kovecses 2015: 3; Musolff 2015).
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The inferential dimension of metaphors has been developed in depth by the
Relevance Theory, according to which a metaphorical utterance results in a “wide
array of contextual implications” that can be retained or discarded depending on
their cognitive effects (Carston 2002: 85; Wilson and Carston 2006; Sperber and
Wilson 2008). However, it is unclear how a metaphorical expression can trigger
these inferences, or rather, how it is possible to represent in an objective way the
inferences that are activated.
5.2 Metaphors and connotation
The stereotypical associations that are evoked by a metaphorical utterance can be
analyzed considering the notion of connotation (Dobrzyńska 1995: 597; Kittay
1989: 147–149). Connotation can be defined as ameaning of a term that is different
from its lexicographic definition, and that is commonly associated with its deno-
tation. A strict formulation of this definition is the following (Mel’čuk 2015: 283;
Mel’čuk and Iordanskaja 2009):
Ameaning ‘σ’ is a lexical connotation of an LU L of language L if and only if ‘σ’
satisfies simultaneously Conditions 1–2:
1. ‘σ’ is associated by language L with the denotation of L and has observable
linguistic manifestations in L.
2. ‘σ’ is not part of L’s lexicographic definition.
This definition involves the linguistic manifestation (such as in phrasemes or
derivatives) of a lexical connotation. This requirement excludes encyclopedic
connotations that are bound to a culture more than a linguistic system. However,
this criterion underscores an aspect of connotation that can provide an objective
criterion for justifying it, namely its manifestation.
According to the broader accounts of connotation (for an overview, see
Garza-Cuarón, 1991, pp. 230–235), connotative meaning is described as speech
meaning, which can derive from different sources (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1977: 167)
and becomes integrated at a cultural level (Garza-Cuarón 1991: 213–214). The
context in which a lexical item is used can become culturally associated with the
use of a specific term, which acquires amore stable connotative meaning (Kerbrat-
Orecchioni 1977: 119). In a sense, the lexical items thus “encapsulate”prior cultural
knowledge and contexts of experience (Stubbs 2001: 3–4); as Kecskes put it, “they
carry context (prior context), encoding the history of their prior use (prior context)
in a speech community” (Kecskes 2008; Kecskes 2013; Kecskes and Zhang 2009). In
particular, Kecskes points out a dimension of meaning (which involves “word-
specific elements” and “culture-specific conceptual properties,” see Cruse 1992;
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Kecskes 2003: 40–43) distinct from the semantic (definitional, or better concep-
tual) one.
We can draw a correspondence between the first dimension (including both
lexicalizedand cultural properties of a lexical item) and the “emotivemeaning,” and
between the second (conceptual) dimension and the “descriptive meaning.” They
jointly constitute what Kecskes refers to as “coresense,” namely “a summary of the
most familiar, regular, typical, and (generally, but not always) frequent uses of a
word” reflecting the history of use of the word (Kecskes 2013: 141) – its “diachronic
pragmatics” (Kecskes 2019: 503–504). This “mini-world or universe of discourse”
created by the use of a word (Stubbs 2001: 7) mirrors its conventions of usage,
namely how it is used for accomplishing specified purposes (Gibbs 1984: 296).
The prior contexts can be conceived as sets of possible inferences that can be
drawn from theuseof aword (cf. thenotion of “schemata” inStubbs 2001: 7–10). The
repeated use of a word to pursue a specific conclusion can crystallize (Jeshion 2016:
134) the premise leading to the intended conclusion, which is commonly referred to
as “stereotype” in philosophy of language and “warrant” or “topos” in logic and
dialectics. This account captures the intuition developed by Ducrot in his theory of
topoi. According to Ducrot, an utterance can be described as a bundle of topoi,
namely argumentative connections representing instructions such as “uttering x,
the conclusion y is supported” (Ducrot 1979; Anscombre and Ducrot 1983). As a
consequence, the “connotation” of words can be described not starting from a
previous knowledge of reality (their “descriptive meaning”) but considering their
discursive (argumentative) potential (Ducrot 1984; Ducrot 1993). These inferences
are not necessarily linguistically manifested. However, they are commonly associ-
ated with the use of a lexical item (Kecskes 2019), so that the use of the latter triggers
inferences that are part of the common ground of the interlocutors.
6 Metaphors as triggers of implicit arguments
The arguments that are necessary for interpreting the dialogical (discursive)
function of a metaphorical utterance do not exhaust the inferential “power”
thereof. As Davidson underscored, an account of metaphorical inferences needs to
explain how the “original”meaning of a vehicle remains active in a metaphorical
setting (Davidson 1978: 34). In our specific perspective, it is necessary to explain
how a vehicle can trigger inferences that are not directly relevant to the conclusion
that it is used to support, and that are commonly triggered by its use. The notion of
connotation can provide a useful starting point: the frequent use of an expression
in specific contexts develops and crystallizes a range of inferences that remain
active in a metaphorical uses (see Carston 2010). The problem is to determine
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objectively what these inferences are: to this purpose, the tools of corpus lin-
guistics (Semino 2008b; Semino et al. 2015) will be used for establishing the most
frequent contexts of use of a vehicle in a specific language, and thus the common
conclusions it is used to support.
6.1 Connotation and implicit premises in the “dancing”
metaphor
In our Example 1, the conversational effects of describing the fluctuating blood
pressure as “dancing” go beyond the indication of a practical argument from rules.
One of the additional argumentative effects can be reconstructed considering the
common associations that “dancing” has in similar contexts, and in particular the
common inferences that are drawn from it. If we analyze the most common contexts
in which this metaphor occurs in Italian, we notice that it is commonly associated
with negative events. To assess this hypothesis, a corpus linguistic package, Sketch
Engine.7 was used to perform a quantitative investigation of a corpus (in this case,
the Italian corpus available in the software plus an additional corpus obtained
through a manual search on Google using the key phrase “è ballerina/a” (to be
dancing) in the construction copula + adjective phrase). 106 occurrences in total
were found, of which 40 are used descriptively to indicate instability (the light is
dancing; the Earth is dancing…) and thus are argumentatively neutral, while all the
remaining 66 occurrences are argumentatively used to trigger a negative evaluation.
This negative judgment is usually specified by distinct strategies:
– Semantic-pragmatic markers, and in particular the adversative conjunction
“but” conjoining two evaluative clauses (Anscombre and Ducrot 1977; Ducrot
1972) (signaling an implicit conclusion that is contradicted by the second
conjunct). Example: “the heart of a priest is not dancing, but it is pierced and
firm in our Lord.”
– Elaborations (Lascarides and Asher 2008) of metaphorical moves providing
negative evaluations, or metaphorical moves of elaborations following se-
quences expressing negative evaluations. Example: “also my health is dancing
and cannot go too far away from the plane where I live”; “The defense continues
to be dancing, five goals in two matches are a lot.”
– Corrections (Lascarides and Asher 2008) of negative judgments potentially
triggered by metaphorical moves. Example: “[…] people think that I am a bit
dancing in romantic relations, but it is not true. I am an artist, I live of and for
love.”
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The most typical negative judgment is related to the value of stability (unstable,
therefore unreliable), focus (not concentrated, therefore weak or subject to
errors), certainty (uncertain, therefore dangerous), or fragility (weak, therefore
dangerous). In this sense, the metaphor is commonly associated with negative
evaluations that in the case of pressure can affect the dimension of the stability and
reliability of health conditions (the pressure is not stable and thus the health
condition weak or fragile), and lead to possible action-oriented judgments (the
pressure can be dangerous). The “dancing” metaphor thus triggers an implicit
argument that is based on the negative assessment of a state of affairs and leads to
a desire of action. This inference can be represented as follows (See Figure 2):
In this figure, the metaphorical move (A) combines with commonly shared
evaluative presumptions that are associated with “dancing,” namely the implicit
premises (1) and (2). This implicit argument from evaluative classification (Mac-
agno andWalton 2018) leads to the conclusion (3), which is in turn combined with
the consequent of (A) (I measure it) in premise (4). This type of reasoning can be
reconstructed as a practical argument (Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008: 94–96)
based on a possible negative state of affairswhich can occur in the future and leads
to the ultimate conclusion (5).
This type of argumentative reconstruction captures one of the possible in-
ferences that “dancing” can trigger. An additional dimension characterizing the
“dancing”metaphor is its use for triggering emotions. In the corpus, the metaphor
is used for expressing or reporting fear situations (17 instances) and contempt (10
instances). For example, “dancing” is used to describe a condition that justifies the
fear of going far away (“my health is dancing”), of being betrayed (“in addition to
this worry, the minister unwillingly suggests that the majority in the Parliament is
Figure 2: Argumentative structure of metaphor use – “dancing”.
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dancing”), or of serious consequences (“the hearth is dancing and diseases can
attack a debilitated organism”).
This type of inference, normally associated with the use of “dancing” to
describe health conditions, can be represented as an argument from fear appeal
(Walton et al. 2008: 102–105):
In this sense, the metaphor can involve an additional and implicit action-ori-
ented element, namely the emotion commonly evoked by similar contexts of use.
6.2 Connotation and implicit premises in the “journey
together” metaphor
This analysis of the (argumentative) metaphorical effects in terms of implicit argu-
ments triggeredby the connotationof a lexical itemusedmetaphorically canbeused to
analyzeanother persuasivemetaphoricalmove thatwe took into account at Section 3.3
above. The concordance analysis on the same corpus as the one used for Example 1
showed that out of 1,125 occurrences of the nominal phrase “journey together,” 1,058
were metaphorical. In these occurrences, the word having a higher T-score is “our”
(5.84), indicating a non-casual association between the phrase and the word. The
qualitative analysis was conducted by detecting in the first 300 occurrences the most
frequent lexemes (at least 2 occurrences) that can alone lead to a metaphorical inter-
pretation of the phrase. The frequency of such lexemes in the whole corpus was then
searched automatically. We selected the terms occurring in the same context (consti-
tuted of 6 words preceding or following the metaphorical phrase) with a frequency
higher than 1%, amounting to a total of 31words. Themost frequent terms (walk - 10%,
and road - 7%) constitute extended metaphors together with “journey together.” The
remaining 29 words were analyzed as belonging to 3 distinct semantic fields:
– “Personal/intimate relation” (meeting, life, friends, sharing, story, partner,
love, couple, family, relation, community, trust, hearth) (54% of occurrences);
– “Decision” (decision, choice, project, goal, change) (14%);
– “Help” (help, assist, face, give a hand, support, problem, pain) (13%).
From this analysis, we can infer that these concepts are the ones normally asso-
ciated with the metaphor “journey together,”which can be thus evoked by its use.
Argumentation scheme : Argument from fear appeal.
PREMISE If you are not acting in an appropriate way, then your blood pressure will continue to
be dancing.
PREMISE A dancing blood pressure is very bad for you.
PREMISE Therefore, you ought to prevent a dancing blood pressure if possible.
354 F. Macagno
If we analyze the firstmetaphor togetherwith its variant, usedby the physician (the
“journey with you”), we notice that the argument from commitment that justifies
the conversational goal of the move is not the only one. The two metaphors do not
describe only a commitment, but also a situation in which the interlocutor’s
dedication to the joint activity is the result of a common value (for example, respect
and altruism in case of “working together;” friendship and altruism in case of
“journey together”). By using thesemetaphors, the physician indirectly appeals to
a personal relation and a common project. The commitment of the patient thus
stems from a set of values that is likely to share. This type of reasoning can be
represented as follows (Walton et al. 2008: 321):
In this case, we notice that the journey metaphor (further specified through
the final clause “to help you”) provides an argumentative premise (the value of
“having a joint project”) that is not explicit in the text. In this sense, the meta-
phor adds an implicit premise that modifies the argumentative structure of the
move.
7 Non-persuasive metaphorical moves and their
argumentative potential
The argumentative analyses developed in Sections 3 and 5 can be used for
analyzing also a fundamental dimension of the communicative effects of meta-
phors that are not used in persuasive moves, namely that are not directly intended
to express an argument. Some of the metaphorical moves that do not directly
communicate an argument can lead to an inference that can be perceived as
intended or not intended by the speaker, which can affect the communication in
different ways. These side-arguments triggered by the use of a vehicle need to be
considered as an argumentative potential of the metaphor, namely conclusions
that can be drawn only based on the common associations with a specific lexical
item.
Argumentation scheme : Argument from values.
PREMISE  The value of having a joint project of helping the patient is positive as judged by
the patient.
PREMISE  The fact that the value of having a joint project of helping the patient is positive
affects the interpretation and therefore the evaluation of providing all the
necessary data instantiating it.
CONCLUSION The value of having a joint project of helping the patient is a reason for retaining
commitment to providing all the necessary data.
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For example, in our Example 3, the metaphorical move was aimed at making
a proposal (recommendation). The vehicle (“reasoned”) was used for describing
the action that the patient was demanded to perform (self-monitoring his glycemic
values):
Nurse: “For a person whoworks, I understand that it is more complex. However, we need to do it
like I say, a bit more reasoned, as I can start off with a good value, but what happens after
I have eaten?”
This metaphor, however, can trigger indirect (not “manifest”) argumentative ef-
fects. To explore this hypothesis, its collocations were analyzed according to the
aforementionedmethodology. The collocation candidates (in the Italian corpus) of
this lemma having the highest statistical association values (log-dice) (Rychlý
2008), excluding its use as a noun phrase “Annotated bibliography”, are “aware”
(frequency: 92), “reasonable” (frequency: 60), “thoughtful” (frequency: 25), and
“instinctive” (frequency: 11). In all these cases, most of the uses of the term are
related to a choice or a decision (54%), either for describing it directly by conveying
a positive judgment, or for evaluating positively the action on which a choice can
bemade (a reasoned use; a reasoned purchase). The other frequent use of the term
is for evaluating a state of affairs positively (34%), or negatively by denouncing the
lack of this characteristic (8%). “Reasoned” is thus used in contrast with the
notions of “emotion (in the sense of instinct),” “ignorance,” and other concepts
that are in conflict with balance, order, and attention. “Reasoned” thus appear as
an evaluative termused in argumentative contexts for promoting a course of action
or praising a state of affairs.
In our example, this “connotation” is used to trigger two distinct arguments.
On the one hand, the physician is qualifying the method for making the mea-
surements (profiles) in away that leads the patient to retaining his commitments to
it (he cannot deny an action that is reasoned). On the other hand, she is attacking
implicitly the way the patient is measuring his values (not reasoned enough). In
both cases, the argument can be reconstructed as implicit argument from values
(Argumentation scheme 6), which in the second (more complex) inference can be
represented as follows:
PREMISE  The value of associated with by “reasoned” (acting thoughtfully, reasonably, and
in an organized way, as opposed to confusingly or disorderly) are positive as
judged by the patient.
PREMISE  The fact that the values associated with by “reasoned” are positive affects the
interpretation and therefore the evaluation of the way the patient is doing his
profiles, which is described as not characterized by it.
CONCLUSION The values associated with by “reasoned” are a reason for rejecting the
commitment to the way the patient is doing his profiles.
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This metaphor is thus a trigger of evaluative inferences, which can justify the
proposal made by the nurse affecting the patient’s assessment of the past and
proposed measurement procedure in a twofold way.
Metaphors can trigger also implicit, side-arguments in metaphorical moves
aimed at sharing information. In Example 4 above, the physician is using the
“river” metaphor, establishing an analogy between “polluting substances” and
glucose. Also in this case, the metaphor is not neutral from an evaluative point of
view. Among the most frequent adjectives co-occurring with the vehicle in the
Italian corpus, we can find only three that can be used to express a value judgment,
namely “dangerous,” “harmful,” and “toxic,”which lead to a negative assessment
of the state of affairs that is characterized by having or producing “polluting
substances.” This connotation is not excluded by themetaphorical use of the noun
phrase, which can trigger an implicit evaluation of the patient’s condition (if my
blood is polluted, then it is dangerous/toxic), and possible inferences from con-
sequences (if my blood is polluted, then I am in danger/I can suffer damages).
8 Conclusion
This paper advances the theoretical grounds of amethodological proposal–whose
reliability needs to be confirmed by further empirical studies – for analyzing the
arguments conveyed by metaphors, addressing the complex relationship between
the persuasive function of metaphors and the arguments that they can convey
starting from the notions of persuasion and conversational relevance. In partic-
ular, it investigates how the contextual effects of metaphor uses explained by the
Relevance Theory in terms of strong and weak implicatures can be analyzed at a
non-cognitive level. The problem is to develop a method for reconstructing and
justifying the arguments directly and indirectly triggered by metaphorical moves
on linguistic evidence that can make such reconstructions replicable.
The definition of metaphorical move (Kittay 1989: 148) was shown to provide a
crucial element for reconstructing the patterns of arguments thatmetaphors can be
used to convey. By identifying the generic goal of a move and the specific con-
clusions that it leads to, it is possible to determine the structure of the arguments
(Macagno 2017; Macagno 2018). However, the reconstruction of the “necessary”
argumentative relation (namely the one guaranteeing the relevance of the meta-
phorical expression) explains only one of the arguments that metaphorical moves
can trigger. To retrieve the arguments “weakly” implied by metaphorical moves, it
is necessary to adopt a bottom-up approach (Kittay 1989: 158), investigating the
meanings analogically related to the vehicle and compatible with the relevance
constraints. To this purpose, the notion of connotation was explored, to show the
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relationship between a word’s prior contexts of use and its potential inferences.
The contexts frequently associatedwith aword’s use thus also define its inferential
potential. In this sense, the reconstruction of metaphorical meaning was shown to
be not only constrained by the general and specific purpose of the metaphorical
move, but also by the connotation of the vehicle.
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